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This thesis develops and evaluates a methodology designed
to quantify perceptions of alternative military retirement
plans and components of retirement systems. The technique
consists of factoring retirement proposals into common
characteristics, surveying a sample of the military popu-
lation, asking them to rank and weight characteristic im-
portance and score how each plan fulfills each characteristic,
and computing a relative weighted preference for each plan.
Based on successful demonstration of this methodology using
a sample of military officer students at the Naval Post-
graduate School, it is recommended that this method be
expanded to a sample of the entire military population. In
view of the recent criticism alleging inefficiency and ex-
pensiveness of the existing system, the results of such an
effort could be useful to the effectiveness portion of a
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I, INTRODUCTION
A. CHARACTERISTICS OF MILITARY RETIREJENT PROGRAMS
The existing provisions for military retirement are just
a subset of the complex U.S. military compensation system
based on laws which now fill several volumnes of the United
States Code, which in turn have been interpreted and ampli-
fied by countless courts and Comptroller General decisions
occupying hundreds of additional volumnes. Compensation
includes basic pay, quarters and subsistence (either in kind
or cash), a guaranteed lifetime annuity in retirement, re-
enlistment bonuses, special hazardous duty pays, commissary
and exchange privileges and medical and dental care.
U.S. military retirement practice itself dates back to
the Revolutionary War when one-half pay for life was promised
to officers remaining on active duty until the end of the
war. Since then, various retirement plans have been initi-
ated and enacted by Congress. In IS70, the option to retire
after 30 years of active service began and the basis for
the existing system was founded.
At least since the First Quadrennial Review of Military
Compensation (the "Hubbell study" or QRMC) was released in
1966, the compensation system in general and retirement in
particular has been increasingly criticized. The QPJVIC
charged that retirement provisions provided neither manage-
ment effectiveness for the government nor equity to the
10

member /ref. 2/. The President's Commission on Military
Compensation (PGMC) reported in 1978 that the retirement
system was ineffective, inefficient and too expensive /ref. 12/.
Indeed, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has projected
that retirement costs under the current system would reach
$12.8 billion by 1981, a 33 percent increase over the 1978
appropriation /ref . ^
.
A comprehensive background on the military retirement
issue in the context of the total compensation system is
presented in Appendix A. The compensation issue in general,
and the specific choice of which retirement plan to chose
are significant issues not likely to be easily resolved.
The problem then, was that the existing military retire-
ment plan was perceived by many to be ineffective and too
expensive. Resolution presumably lies in either proving
that the existing system is more cost effective than any
feasible alternative or identifying the most efficient al-
ternative retirement plan from the many under consideration.
This general problem is certainly challenging considering
the difficulty of measuring effectiveness in any terms, much
less attempting to weigh it against dollar costs.
B. PURPOSE AND METHODOLOGY OF THE THESIS
This thesis is diracted towards gaining further insight
in the narrower area of perceived effectiveness. The problem
this thesis attempts to solve is, how to measure users'




- A survey of a limited sample of the military population.
- Asking respondents to judge recently considered alter-
native retirement plans based on two factors: their
own interests and how each alternative might meet the
defined retirement system objectives of the military.
- Factoring alternative systems into common characteristics
Respondents are asked to rank and weight characteristic
importance and score how each plan fulfills that
characteristic
.
- Computing relative weighted scores for each plan for
each respondent. (note 1)
- Displaying each complete plan and asking respondents
to rank order their preference.
The specific objective of this thesis is to evaluate
this method as a vehicle for identifying!
- Perceived most crucial components of military retirement
plans
.
- Most favored plans on a relative scale.
The four plans evaluated are described in Appendix A,
Figures ^3, kS , 4? and ^8. They are the existing system,
the plan proposed by the President's Commission on Military
Compensation (PCMC)
, the Two-tier plan developed within BOD
and similar in concept to the Retirement Modernization Act
(RMA) of the early 1970' s, and the latest plan submitted by
the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) in early 1979 and under
consideration by the President at the time of this writing.
C. STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS
Chapter II discusses the surveyed population, the survey
document itself, and how relative weighted preference is
calculated for each respondent. Chapter III presents the
12

analysis of the reply data. First, the whole sample is
analyzed by detailing their personal profile and how the
respondents judged the relative importance of retirement
plan characteristics, each alternative's provisions for the
characteristics, and the total plans themselves. Then an-
alysis is undertaken to seek perceptual differences among
subgroups (i.e. by rank, service, etc.) of the sample.
Finally, conclusions based on the data analysis are dra.-jm
relative to the surveyed population and also in regards to
the stated objective of the thesis. Chapter IV includes
recommendations concerning further use of this methodology.
References cited throughout the text are listed at the
end of the thesis. Identifying or clarifying notes are
grouped at the end of each chapter.
D. NOTES FOR CHAPTER I
1. The idea of the weighted relative merit technique
was taken from a 1973 Air University thesis by then LtCol
D.L. Anderson. Therein, the existing system, RMA , civil
service and private sector retirement plans were compared




A. THE POPULATION AND ITS LIMITATIONS
The population from which the sample was dra'/^ consisted
of the 937 military and other uniformed service officer
students attending the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) in
March 1979. While all branches of the military plus the
National Oceanographic Atmospheric Administration (NCAA)
were included, the sample could hardly be considered repre-
sentative of the military population. These NPS students
were all officers grade C-2 to 0-5 and as indicated by their
selection to attend the school have, at least generally,
enjoyed a successful and promising career or otherwise ceen
screened from the overall military population.
B. THE SURVEY DOCUMENT
1
. Structure and Content
The following discussion addresses the survey docu-
ment which is displayed in Appendix 3.
Section I defines both the objective of txhe survey
and "effectiveness" in terms of a retirement system as it
might be viewed by the military services. The definition
of effectiveness for military retirem.ent program.s is taken
verbatim from the First QRI-IC with the exception of the
deletion of " . .
.
, and protected against the inroads of
inflation" from the last sentence under "just treatment of
the member" ^ef. 2/. The survey's methodology is then ex-
plained to the potential respondent.

Section II contains the survey questions and is
divided into four parts. The first part solicits personal
data, opinions on the impact of the retirement system on
one's decision to join the service, and information on one's
career intentions both now and at time of enlistment.
In the second part, retirement plans are compared
by component. Retirement plans in general are factored into
six defined characteristics: early retirement, arjiuities,
vesting, severance pay, benefits, and grandfathering. The
various options offered within these characteristics are
presented and respondents are asked to rank order their
preference for how each plan meets each characteristic
(beginning on page 7 of the survey). To further quantify
their preference, respondents are asked to score how well
they feel each plan fulfills each of the six characteristics.
Thus, each respondent is ranking and scoring how he or she
feels a particular retirement plan meets or fulfills each
of the defined characteristics. (Note 1).
The respondents are then asked to consider the rela-
tive importance of the characteristics themselves as parts
of a total retirement plan (page 13 of the survey) . They are
asked to rank order, then weight the six characteristics.
In the forth part, the survey displays the four
alternative plans in total (pages 21 to 2? of the survey).
The plans are not identified by name or source in the survey;
however, plan one represents the existing system, plan two
is the PCMC proposal, plan three is the two tier plan, and
15

plan four is the SECDEF plan. The final survey question asks
that the plans be rank ordered.
Section III of the survey is a feedback request form





A significant limitation of the survey document is
that it would not be suitable for universal application as
written. It was drafted by a MPS student and intended to
be distributed only to his peers; and therefore is designed to
communicate with only a small portion of the military population.
The requirement that respondents reply based on what
they think is best for them and the military assumes that re-
tirement system effectiveness for the individual is not in
conflict with effectiveness for the service. Consideration
was given to constructing the survey to allow for two or even
three replies to each of the key questions: one answer for the
individual, one for the service and perhaps one for an average
or overall reply. However, after giving a small pre-survey
and finding out how long it took to answer the questions as they
were (about an hour), it was decided not to expand the document.
The severance pay issue was not directly addressed
under the Two-tier plan. It was assumed that if a Two-tier
plan were ultimately proposed by DCD, it would have similar
severance pay provisions to the SECCEF plan. Therefore, in




Several other components of military retirement
systems are noted in Appendix A but are not defined as
characteristics within the survey. They include the con-
tributory/non-contributory issue, bases for retirement pay
raises, social security offset and provisions for dealing
with dual compensation. While these features are relevant
for a general comparison of military retirement alternatives,
they were omitted in this work because they were either common
to all considered alternatives or not sufficiently defined
within the currently considered alternatives.
C. COMPUTATION OF RELATI'/E WEIGHTED PREFERENCE
The key perceived merit measure of each survey response
is the relative weighted preference for each of the four
alternative plans. These relative weighted preferences are
calculated in tliree steps for each respondent as depicted
in Figure 1 and explained below:
Step 1. Raw characteristic weights assigned by the re-
spondent are normalized by summing the weights assigned to
each of the six characteristics and dividing each raw weight
by that sum. The result is a normalized weight for each
characteristic
.
Step 2. The normalized weight for each characteristic
is then multiplied by the fulfillment score the respondent
assigned for each retirement plan's provision under that
characteristic. The result is a product (assigned the
symbol "WxS") for each characteristic under that plan.
17

step 3' These products (WxS) are then summed within
each plan to arrive at a relative weighted preference for
that particular alternative retirement system. (Note 2).
These calculations are based on two assumptions:
1. Since benefits were not currently addressed in
either the Two-tier or SECDEF plan, scores for this charac-
teristic under these plans were assigned values equal to the
average scores allotted by the respondent to the other two
(existing and PCMC) plans. Thus, the first assumption
is that benefits provided under a Two-tier or SECDEF plan
would be equal to the average of benefits perceived under
the existing and PCMC plans.
2. The second assumption concerns the fact that, by
definition, grandfathering cannot be scored for the existing
system. In order to complete the calculation while not
penalizing the existing system, grandfathering under zhe
existing plan was assigned a score equal in value to the
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D. NOTES FOR CHAPTER II
1. It may be noted on pages 8-18 of the survey that
within characteristics, there may be two, three or four
options to choose from. This happens because some plans
share common provisions within characteristics.
2. Another assumption, implicit in the method used for
calculating relative weighted preference, is that of
linearity. We are presuming that component characteristic
products (WxS) can be added linearly to arrive at relative




A. DATA ANALYSIS OF THE WHOLE SAT^LE
1
.
Profile of the Sample
Two hundred seventy eight survey documents (or 30%
of those distributed) were returned completed. Many noted,
either on the survey or in person to the author, that it
took at least an hour to complete. One hundred thirty nine
students requested feedback, indicating that half of the
respondents were interested in the fruits of their labor,
the retirement issue, or perhaps both.
Twenty of the 273 surveys returned lacked one or
more of the score or weight value replies needed to calcu-
late relative weighted preference. While there are statisti-
cal methods available for dealing with such missing values,
it was felt that omission of this relatively small number
of cases from the large sample was prudent and hence, missing
value techniques were not employed.
Branch, rarJt
,
and years of service profiles for the
sample are displayed in Figures 2 through ^ respectively.
(Notes 1,2).
The sample can be categorized by modal tendencies
of career intention and opinion replies shown in Figures 5
through 7. The military retirement system had a significant
effect on their decision to join the service, yet respondents
were unsure about their career intentions when they signed













ARMY 1. 21 10.5 10.5
NAVY 2. 132 70.5 81 .0
US /!F 3. 15 5. 8 86 . 8
USMC <^. 21 8.1 95.0
USCG 5. 12 ^.7 qc. 6
OTHER 6. 1 .^ 100. C
TOTIL 258 100.
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Figure 7 - CAREER INTENTIONS NOW
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2 . Retirement Plan Characteristics
a. Characteristic Importance Weights
(1) Mean Characteristic Wei.^hts . Recall from
Chapter II that the respondents were asked to assign weights
to the six characteristics of retirement plans based on how
important they felt these characteristics were as part of
a total retirement plan. These "raw weights" were normalized
to facilitate calculation of the relative weighted preference
for each who-e plan.
Based on the mean weights shc/m in Figure 2,
both raw and normalized, those surveyed clearly felt that
early retirement and annuities, respectively, were the most
important characteristics of retirement plans. Benefits
and grandfathering were next, followed by vesting and
severance pay respectively.
(2) Testing for Significant Difference . The
differences among the raw characteristic weight means were
statistically significant well beyond the .001 level. Fig-
ure 50 in Appendix C summarizes the one way analysis of
variance (ANOVA) conducted to arrive at this conclusion.
By design, the normalized weights are con-
strained in that they must sum to 1. For this reason ANOVA




CHARACTERISTIC RAW WEIGHT '//EIGHT





Severance Pay 48.632(23.956) .115(.063)
(with Standard Deviation)
Figure 8 - CHARACTERISTIC IMPORTANCE WEIGHTS
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b. Characteristic Importance Rankings
In addition to weighting characteristics respond-
ents were asked to rank order the six characteristics to
indicate how important they felt they were within a military
retirement plan.
Frequencies of rank response by characteristic
are displayed in Figures 9 through 14. The overwhelming
perceived importance of the defined early retirement character-
istic seems obvious. Almost 59?5 of the respondents felt it
was number one in importance. Cnly IJfo ranked early retire-
ment lower than number three. Annuities seems to be second
with 67% of the sample ranking it at least second. Benefits
and grandfathering seem to be perceived as the next mcst
important characteristics with cumulative frequencies of
59% and 3^% at the number three rank respectively. Vesting
and severance pay appear least preferred with cumulative
frequencies of 62% at the fourth rank and 73% at the fifth
rank respectively. These rank orderings of characteristic
importance seem to agree with the average weighted preferences
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3- Plan Fulfillment of Characteristics
a. Fulfillment Scores
(1) Mean Scores . Respondents were also asked
to indicate how well they thought various plans fulfilled
defined characteristics by assigning scores from to 100 to
available options. These data are summarized in Figure 15
and were analyzed by evaluating the means of the several
fulfillment scores. Within the early retirement and benefits
characteristics, provisions of the existing system were
clearly favored. The existing plan also scored highest,
albeit by a smaller margin, in annuities and severance pay
respectively. The PCMC proposal scored highest in the
vesting characteristic, closely followed by the Two-tier
plan. The SECDEF plan scored highest in grandfathering,
with the Two-tier provisions a relatively close second.
(2) Testing for Significant rifference . Dif-
ferences among the mean characteristic fulfillment scores
for each plan were analyzed using analysis of variance
(ANOVA) techniques and were found to be statistically sig-
nificant well beyond the .001 level. In other words the
mean score for the existing plan's fulfillment of tne early
retirement characteristic differed significantly from the
PCMC, Two- tier and SECDEF mean fulfillment scores for




MEAN CHARACTERISTIC FULFILLMENT SCORE, BY PLAN
(With Standard Deviation)
CHARACTERISTIC EXISTING PCMC T'.'/C-TIER
Early Retirement 92.492 33-930 53- 713 Same as
(15.067) (26.413) (25.395) Two-tier
Annuities 82.674 65.953 51-531 Same as
(20.379) (27.417) (27.204) Tv/o-tier
Vesting 22.120 63.686 5:^.260 65.I5I
(35-5^2) (23.756) (25-324) (23.696)
Severance Pay 61.295 53 '^03 50.667 Same as
(30.816) (29-797) (30.738) Two-tier
Benefits 30.242 43.322 N/A N/A
(2d. 120) (30.693)
Grandfathering n/A 53.5SI 65. 673 67.673
(23.969) (29-151) (30.379)




b. Rank Order Preference
As noted in Chapter II, respondents were asked
to rank order the way they felt plans provided for each
characteristic. Analysis of the frequencies of their re-
sponses seems to support the findings of the average score
method (as summarized in Figure 15)- Plans with the
highest frequency of number one rankings also had the high-
est average score within each characteristic and the relative
order of perceived fulfillment/provision appeared tc be the
same by both methods.
Figures 16 to 33 detail the sample's response
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Figure 18 - RAMED PREFERENCE, EARLY RETIREMENT
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k. How Total Plans Fared in Preference
a. Relative Weighted Preference
(1) Mean Relative V/ei^hted Preference . Chapter
II (Figure 1) described how relative weighted preference
was calculated from the survey responses as a measure of
perceived relative merit among retirement plans. Sample
mean relative weighted preferences are provided in Figure 3^'
Considering weight and plan fulfillment scores within
characteristics, it is not surprising that, wi*hin this
sample, the existing system well outdistanced the other
three alternative plans in average relative weighted prefer-
ence. The SECDEF plan ranked second with the Two-tier
plan a close third.
( 2
)
Testing for Sigriifleant Cifference . As
depicted in the ANOVA table (Figure 52 of Appendix C) , "he
difference in mean relative weighted preference among plans
was significant well beyond the .001 level. It appears the
difference is coming primarily from the large difference




MEAN RELATIVE V/EIC-HTED PREFERENCE
RETIREMENT PLAN (AND STANDARD DEVIATION^
Existing Plan 75.3^6(15.033)




. 057 ( ii+. 399)
SECDEF Plan 58.270(16.3?^)
Figure 3^ - MEAN RELATIVE WEIGHTED PREFERENCE
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b. Indicated Preference by Rank Order
The final survey question asked respondents to
rank order their preference for each of the four displayed
plans. The frequencies of their ranking are displayed in
Figures 35 through 38.
It seems clear that the existing system was most
favored (Figure 35) and the PCMC plan (Figure 36) the least
favored, which concurs with the mean relative weighted pref-
erence values just discussed. The distribution of the
rankings for the Two- tier and SECESF plans highlights the
closeness of these two plans in the sample's perception (see
Figures 37 and 38). It might be pres'umed that the 3ZCE2F
plan is slightly favored between the two by virtue of its 5^
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Figure 38 - INDICATED RANK PREFERENCE, SECDEF PLAN
o4

3- Comments on Parity
In the foregoing analysis of characteristic im-
portance, plan fulfillment of characteristics and total
plan preference, it was noted that the frequencies of the
rankings tended to support the average weights, scores or
relative weighted preference. While this tendency was
observed for the sample as a whole, individuals did not
necessarily respond with parity: i.e. with scores or
weights that corresponded with their rarJcings . Examples of
such a lack of parity could be: an individual rarJcs early
retirement as tne most important (number 1) characteristic
but assigns higher weight to the annuities characteristic;
or a respondent ranks fulfillment of a characteristic by
plans 1, 2, 3, 4 but assigns fulfillment scores of 25, 100,
50, 80 respectively.
As noted in Figure 39 > this lack of parity varied
from three percent of the sample for cr.aracteristic i.T.pcr-
tance to I5 percent for judging how plans fulfilled the
early retirement characteristic. Parity checking between






NOT RESPO.f^rDING WITH PARITY












Figure 39 - PARITY SUMMARY
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B. DATA ANALYSIS BY SUB SAMPLE
In the previous section, the perceptions of the sample
as a whole were analyzed. Respondent replies were also
evaluated to determine if they differed among subgroups.
These subgroups were formed by breaking dc-vn the population
by branch of service, rank, effect of retirement on enlist-
ment, career intentions and years of service (YoS).
While this methodology was not necessarily appropriate
for application to this sample, it is nevertheless partially
presented here since it is possible it would enhance analysis
of a sample representative of the entire military popula-
tion by identifying different perception among subgroups.
First, average raw characteristic weights were broken
down by subgroup and analyzed for the existence cf any sig-
nificant difference. At the .05 level it. was found that mean
weights for the importance of vesting differed significantly
by rank and current career intentions. The weights assigned
to severance pay also differed among the 3ervi::es. Figure
53 in Appendix C illustrates the latter breakdown and ANCVA.
Next, a similar break do^,vn was conducted for fulfillment
scores within characteristics. Mean scores for 11 character-
istic provisions (or lOfo of the 1C3 tests conducted) were
found to differ significantly at the .0 5 level amcng one cr
more subgroup. Figure '^0 lists those variables. This result
is probably not significant since several false rejections
should be expected when a large number of tests are conducted.
Figure 5^ in Appendix C details the breakdown and ANCVA of
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one of these set of variables (grandfathering under the SECLEF
plan by YoS)
.
Finally, mean relative weighted preferences for all four
plans were evaluated by branch, rank, etc. subgroups. Sig-
nificant difference at the .05 level was found among mean
relative weighted preference for the existing system, the
PCMC proposal and the SECDEF plan when broken down by effect
of retirement on enlistment. There also was significant
difference among preferences for the existing system by ranJt
.
Given that differences might exist for relative weighted
preference values by subgroup, it remained to evaluate if
those differences resulted in a change in relative standing
among alternative plans. Therefore, mean relative weighted
preferences among plans was broken dc'.vn by effect of retire-
ment on enlistment and rank.
'^Vhile the magnitude of the difference between weighted
preference changed a bit, the overall order of plan prefer-
ence did not change by effect of retirement on enlistment
subgroups. In other words, each group rated the existing
system the highest, SECDEF as second, Two -tier as third,
and PCMC last, just as the whole sample did. See Figure 4l.
When relative weighted preference was broken do'/m by
rank, two subgroups indicated a different overall preference
from that of the sample as a whole. As noted in Figure 42,
while all subgroups continued to indicate they favored the
existing system, 0-2 's preferred the Two- tier to the SSCESF
plan for 2nd place; and 0-5' s preferred the FCMC to the
68
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Two-tier for '}rd place. This result is probably not sig-
nificant, however, because of the extremely small number






VWEN POPULATION IS BROKEN
^07;n by I
Early Retirement, Two- tier
and SECDEF
Effect of retirement on
enlistment
Annuities, Existing system Rank
Effect of retirement on
enlistment
Career intentions now
Annuities, PCMC plan Effect of retirement on
enlistment
Vesting, Existing system Career intentions now
Severance Pay, Two- tier Career intentions at enlistm.en-
Benefits, Existing system Rank
Grandfathering, PCMC Rank
Grandfathering, SECDEF Branch of service
Years of service
Figure 40 - FULFILMENT SCORES WITH SIGNIFICANTLY
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Relative to Surveyed Sample
Those sampled clearly perceived "early retirement,"
as defined, to be the most important characteristic of a
military retirement plan. The "annuities" characteristic
followed closely. "Benefits" and "grandfathering" were next,
with "vesting" and "severance pay" receiving the least
support, respectively.
Perceived relative preference for total retirement
plans clearly favored the existing system and indicated
that the PCMC proposal was least liked. Between the inter-
mediately preferred Two-tier and SSCZE? plans, the latter
enjoyed a slight edge.
2. Relative to Cb.iective of Thesis
The methodology employed seems to have provided a
viable means of quantifying perceptions of:
- Most favored components of military retirement systems,
on a relative scale.
- Relative preference among alternative retirement plans.
D. NOTES FOR CHAPTER III
1. Numerous frequency tables and histograms displayed
in various figures categorize a code or no code at all.
This represents the omission of a question reply on the
part of one or more respondents. As noted earlier, cases
were removed from the sample if score/weight values were




2. The sex breakdown reported by the sample was 3





Within the sample surveyed, the methodology provided a
way to quantify military members' perceptions of the rela-
tive merit of alternative retirement plans. It seems that
a similar technique could be employed to record the per-
ceptions of a sample of the entire military population with
respect to any set of alternative plans. Such an endeavor
could provide information to the decision makers relevant
to effectiveness analysis. Minimum steps involved in such
a future effort might include:
1. Defining component characteristics common to most,
if not all, of the available alternative retirement
proposals
.
2. Factoring each plan according to how it provides for,
or fulfills, each characteristic.
3- Design and distribute to a representative sample of
the military population a survey similar in structure
to that shown in Appendix 3, modified for the specific
alternatives under consideration.
4. Collect and analyze responses.
The results could give insight into how the surveyed
population and/or subgroups perceive:
- relative preference among available alternative plans
- most favored components of retirement plans in seneral,






This appendix synthesizes research in the area of U.S.
Military Non-disability Retirement. First, the evolution
of the military retirement concept as perceived today will
be discussed with emphasis on relevant legislation, viewing
retirement as an element of the entire military compensation
system, and specifics of the current retirement policy. Then
the budgeting, costing and accounting of military retirement
will be examined. Finally, frequently voiced opposition to
existing military retirement plans will be aired and several
current proposed alternatives will be presented.
II. EVOLUTION OF U.S. MILITARY COMPENSATION IN
GENERAL AND RETIREMENT PAY IN PARTICULAR
Brief History of Military ?.etireT.er.~
(From Berkeble and C-audi 19'^6, reference 3)
U.S. Military retirement practices date back -o ~he
Revolutionary War when one-half pay for life was premised
to officers remaining on active duty until the end of the
war. After the war, numerous retirement plans were initiated
and enacted by Congress to cover various circumstances ; how-
ever, none were permanent in nature, nor designed to provide




From the period 1821-1861 there was no non-disability
retirement plan in effect. Since many officers and soldiers
serving on active duty could not qualify for disability re-
tirement yet were not fit to remain on active duty, the
"physical incapacity due to age" concept evolved. This
served to rid the services of those personnel who had
30-50 year's of service and were simply too old to fight.
Eventually, "An Act for the Better Organization of the Mil-
itary Establishment" was passed in 1861 which established
the "length of service" retirement and pension concept,
designed to remove older personnel and make room for younger,
more vigorous servicemen.
The option to retire after 30 years of active service
began in I87O and mandatory retirement for officers failing
to be promoted was initiated in 1399 by the Navy. The
latter "up or oux" policy remains in effect today for all
services, albeit with differing points of mandatory retire-
ment, as a result of the Officer Persorinel Act of 194'^.
Recomputation of Retired Pay (RECOMP) was the practice
whereby retired pay was linked to increases or decreases in
active duty pay. If active duty members received a per-
centage increase in pay, retired members received the same
percentage increase. RECOMP was generally in effect from
I86I until the Joint Services Pay Act of 1922, and again
from 1926 through 1 June 1958 when Public Law 85-422 finally
halted the practice. This constituted a significant setback
to retired personnel as it effectively permitted their
retired pay to be eroded by inflation.
Appendix A '^'^
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The Uniform Services Pay Act of I963 (Public Law S8-I32)
offset the 1958 Act by tying adjustments of military retired
pay to changes in the Consumer Price Index (CPI).
It is noted here that military retirement affects the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Corps, the
Public Health Service and the Coast Guard as well as the
Department of Defense.
Retirement as a Subset of the Conpensaticr. Syste.T.
Any detailed discussion of retirement must recognize non-
disability retirement as another element of the total com-
pensation system which also includes (at least) Regular
Military Pay (RMC, defined later), reenlistment bonuses,
special hazardous duty and incentive pays , Commissary and
Exchange privileges, and Medical and Dental care.
While placing "Military Compensation Change in Perspec-
tive," the Bureau of Naval Persorj-.el (reference ^) concisely
outlined the evolution of the Military Ccmper.satior. System:
"To say that we in the armed forces have a comprehensive
compensation system is like saying that the Constitution of
the United States as it appears now would be recognizable
to the Founding Fathers who drew it up. Jr. Section 8 of
Article I of that very document written nearly two centuries
ago, lies the foundation of today's military compensation
systems ..."To pay the debts and provide for the common
defense... of the United States... To raise and support armies.




broadly-stated phrases has grown a set of laws governing
compensation for the armed forces which now fills several
volumes of the United States Code and which has, in turn,
been interpreted and amplified by countless court and Comp-
troller General's decisions occupying literally hundreds of
additional volumes. Even if the resulting body of law and
interpreting decisions had been designed as a single, compre-
hensive code for a compensation system, its sheer complexity
would preclude understanding by any single individual. The
fact that it evolved in piecemeal fashion as various situ-
ations arose and service conditions changed, has resulted
in a wide range of pays, allowances, entitlements and related
benefits not only confusing, but occasionally contradictory
among themselves. The size of the forces, requirements for
members possessing vastly more technical skills, and the
basic characteristics of the soldiers themselves have changed;
all of which have created demands for new types and philoscphies
of compensation."
"Except during times of mass mobilization, the army and
navy were basically marjied up through World War II with men
who had chosen the service as a lifetime career. They were
essentially "All Volunteer Forces" comprised of individuals
who joined the rarJcs very young and remained until too en-
feebled by age to continue serving. The vast majority of
members, particularly in the enlisted ranks, were unmarried.
They lived aboard ship or in barracks on a military reservation,




Virtually all of their needs were provided for in kind -
clothing, food, medical care and even tobacco and rum. The
low levels of cash pay are legendary today, and until the
post World War II era were considered quite appropriate in
view of the Government's virtual "cradle to grave" care
for the physical needs of its fighting men."
"Adding to the problems already mentioned was the fact
that each of the services was originally administered by
a separate governmental department - initially the War
Department for the Army and Navy Department for the Mavy.
In addition to responding to each need for change in ixs
service's compensation system as an isolated event, these
separate departments further compounded the problem by
competing with each other in their efforts to obtain favor-
able action by Congress for their individual service; thus
creating inequities between compensation for like work in
different armed forces .
"
"It was in this state of disarrary that the 'J.S. Armed
Forces entered the post World War II era and the department
of Defense '»vas founded. Confronted by innumerable troblems
posed by the post war era and faced with the critical obstacle
posed by the service's reluctance to surrender their indi-
viduality, Defense was unable to devote much attention to
modernization of pay systems. ncwever, an attempt was made
through creation of the Kook Commission in 1943 to examine




the recommendations presented by the Commission were incorpor-
ated in the Career Compensation Act of 1949. This was the
first attempt in the 170 year history of the United States
to completely restructure the military compensation system!"
"Though the recommendations of the Hook Commission did
result in some changes to the structure of the pays and
allowances, such as establishment of rates for sea and certain
places pay that are still in effect today, the Commission's
real significance lay in the codified compensation philosophy
it created. Rather than overhauling the system, the Com-
mission formally recognized principles of compensation which
had evolved over time and set down these principles as
guidelines to be followed in years to come."
"While the Hook Commission recognized the continued
need for other special pays and allowances as circumstances
of service warranted, it based ec^ity in compensation on four
key elements: basic pay, quarters, and subsistence either
in kind or cash, and a guaranteed lifetime ar^nuity, pro-
portionate to active duty basic pay, in retirement. Several
other studies were made of the military compensa":iDn system
over the following two decades, and various modificaticns to
other special pays and allowances resulted. However, the
four key elements of the system were retained, virtually
unchanged, except for occasional upward adjustments to
reflect the growing affluence of America in the Cold War era.







essentially unchanged, almost imperceptible changes were
occurring in the characteristics of the service member pop-
ulation; changes which would become dramatically apparent
in the early 1960's and which virtually demanded a total
overhaul of the entire compensation system."
"The circumstances of World War II, Korea and the con-
tinuing tensions of a Cold War required maintenance of larger
standing forces over a sustained period than ever before in
our history. Many members who would not normally have
selected a service career found that they had inadvertently
become careerists. However, unlike previous careerists,
they basically considered themselves civilians on extended
duty. They were willing to serve, cut no longer content to
receive compensation lower than they felt they could receive
in other compensation fields for similar work. At the same
time, these members came to look upon twenty years of military
service as a normal first career, and the 5^/^ ^- basic cay
retired annuity as a handsome second career supplement."
"The results of these changes in viewpoint amcng service-
men were just becoming recognizable when the country became
involved in the Southeast Asia conflict. Concerned by statis-
tical evidence that the increasing retirement rolls were gcing
to create staggering retired pay obligations in a few years,
but equally attuned to the need for full and fair compensa-
tion for servicemen involved in the now unpopular "Vietnam




"The first Congressional action occurred in 196? with
the passage of Public Law 90-20?. In this landmark piece
of legislation, the military equivalent of the civilian
salary was defined as the sum of basic pay, the cash values
of the allowances for quarters and subsistence and the tax
advantage created by the non- taxable status of the two allow-
ances. This military equivalent of the salary was given the
name Regular r»1ilitary Compensation (RMC), a term and defin-
ition still generally recognized and accepted today. A
second key feature of PL 90-20? was the provision for auto-
matic increases in the basic pay portion of RMC whenever a
raise '-vas granted General Schedule Federal employees ; the
amount of the military raise being equal to the average CS
raise, but applied only to the basic pay rather than equally
distributed among the RMC elements."
"The second Congressional action was begun prior to
passage of PL90-20?, however, its results were not reported
until later. This was the First Quadrennial Review cf Mili-
tary Compensation (QRMC) undertaken in 19c6 at Congress'
direction. The findings cf this comprehensive review headed
by RADM Lester Kubbell, USN and often referred to as zr.e
"Hubbell Study," were released in late 1966. This study,
conducted in the draft envirorjnent of the Vietnam era,




1policies for "non-careerists" and "careerists". For the
"non-careerists" the First QRMC recommended retention of
the existing pay and allowances system, but for the "career-
ists" an extensive series of changes in method of compensation
was proposed. Although these recommendations for change in
career military pay philosophy were never acted upon at that
time due to the desire to move toward an All Volunteer Force,
they still set the course for ultimate change in years to
come, and directly or indirectly, have served as the basis
for all changes in compensation instituted since 196 3."
"The five-volume report of the First QRMC made four
basic findings relative to the adequacy of the present com-
pensation system: 1) it is too complex and confusing;
2) it does not reward equitably for equal work; 3) it carjiot
be compared and adjusted equitably in relation to trends in
civilian earnings; and ^) its retirement previsions provide
neither management effectiveness for the government nor
equity to the member. Although the Firs~ QRMC made a total
of 31 specific recommendations for changes in active duty
compensation and ^5 others affecting retirement and survivors'
benefits, all 76 can be said to flow from the above four
generalised findings."
"In essence, for the active duty careerists, the study
observed that the array of twenty-six separate pays,
Non-careerists were defined as all E-l's through S-3's and
those E-4's and S-5's having less than 2 years' service or




allowances, benefits and associated costs existing at that
time made it virtually impossible for an individual to compute
the value of his compensation. For this reason it '/vas con-
cluded that the Government was not realizing the full attrac-
tion and retention benefit from its dollars spent in military
compensation. Further, it was observed, the variances in
pay caused by differing treatment of married and single members
caused inequities in compensation for members performing
identical tasks. An even greater problem was posed by the
lack of a universally recognized pay standard which cculd
be used by both the Government and the serviceman in determin-
ing comparability of pay with the civilian sector. Finally,
it was determined that the current retirement system tended
to hold down active duty pay scales for all, even though
only careerists ever benefitted from it; provided too great
an incentive to terminate a career after only 20 years; did
not adequately reward a member for completing a full career;
and unduly compensated the retiree through payment of two
unrelated annuities for the same period of service once
Social Security elegible."
To provide corrective acticn in response to each cf these
ills, the First QRMC made two general recommendations re-
garding active duty pay for careerists and a series cf
interrelated recommendations for retirement system change.
In the area of active duty pay it was recommended 1) that




equivalent to the value of RMC plus an imputed retirement
contribution, irrespective of dependency status; and 2) that
a standard for pay comparability with the civilian sector
be attained through linkage to the General Schedule and V/age
Board Federal pay scales."
"The recommendations in the area of retired pay were
strikingly similar to the provisions of the Retirement Modern-
ization Act subsequently developed and sent to Congress as
an OSD legislative proposal. The basic features called for
vesting of the retirement contributions of members, to
be returned if the member should leave service prior to re-
tirement; an increasing retirement arjiuity multiplier for
service beyond 20 years ; calculation of retired annuity on
the basis of the "high one year" average salary rather than
on the terminal active duty salary; and finally, an offset
in the Social Security annuity based upon the proportion
of that annuity attributable to military service."
"In addition to recommendations in the areas of active
and retired pay, the First QRMC also proposed a variety of
other actions designed to ensure that "pay distinctions other
than those in the salary table are justified within the
military career force only 1) to meet hard retention or
manning requirements, 2) to secure the requisite number of
volunteers for special duties, or 3) compensate for un-
2usually arduous or dangerous conditions of service."
2Finding 18, Report of the First Quadrennial Review of Mili-
tary Compensation, Volume I, 1 Nov. 6?.
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"To bring special pays, allowances and benefits retained
in addition to the "military salary" into line with the
above three guidelines, the study recommended:
1) Operation of commissaries and exchanges at no cost
to the government.
2) Elimination of the normal reenlistment bonus.
3) Discontinuance of Government payment for FHA mortgage
insurance premiums for military members.
^') Modifications to the VRB program.
5) Examination of the adequacy and continued need for
the various special hazardous duty and incentive pays."
"As anyone familiar with recent or proposed changes ir.
the field of military' compensation will readily recognize,
the recommendations of the First QRMC , though never actea
upon collectively, have provided the basis for virtually
all compensation policy changes since 19"0. Closer examin-
ation reveals that a move toward the recommended salary
system has even occurred with the passage of Public Law
93-^19 in September 197^. This law modifies the automatic
raise provision of PL90-207 to provide for an across-the-
board raise in basic pay and allowances for quarters and
subsistence, rather than in basic pay only, thereby further
establishing the military equivalent of the salary. This,
of course, has been modified by the reallocations of basic
pay raises to BAQ over -he past two years."
"It is quite understandable how any one of the recent
changes in the military compensation system, when viewed




a "breach of faith." When viewed collectively, however, it
becomes apparent that they are piecemeal attempts to achieve
a specific objective: creation of a comprehensive compensa-
tion system for the military which ensures just and equitable
compensation for the member in the most efficient and ef-
fective manner for the Governicent. Efficiency and effective-
ness in this context mean not only cost consciousness, but
also competitiveness with other employers ^/ying for the
skills of the member. Naturally, cost savings must be made
wherever possible in order to free budgeted funds for use
in potentially more critical areas; however, such savings
are a byproduct of a modernized pay system rather than an
objective in themselves."
"The Third Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation
(QRMC) in 1975 again attempted to review the entire spectr'^m
of military compensation with a view tcvard devising a com-
prehensive system attuned to the needs of both the service
member and the Government in the envircnjnent of an All
Volunteer Force."
"The recommendations of the Third QRIVIC , although net
acted upon directly, were referred to the recently-completed
President's Commission on Military Compensation (PCMC) for
further review. The PCMC was charged by the President to
review not only the recommendations of the Third QRxMC , but
also the findings and opinions of the Defense Manpower Com-
mission and various other bodies and agencies such as the




In addition to reviewing these prior studies, the PCWC also
held extensive hearings to solicit the views of individual
service members, both military and civilian service leadership."
"The report of the PMCM, issued in April 1978 contains
far-reaching recommendations for redesign of the military
compensation system. Many of these recommendations were
drawn from prior studies, but some are original PCMC concepts."
(Those PCMC recommendations dealing with retirement are
addressed in section IV.)
Current Retirement Policv
The basic "features" of the existing military retirement
scheme are outlined in Figure ^3 ^o facilitate later com-
parison with alternative plans. Briefly, with seme variations
by service, military people can retire after 20 years of
service (as a privilege rather than a legal right, although
members do have the "right" to retire after 30 years . The
amount of retirement pay received depends upon rank and time
in service (and in the long run: time of retirement and how
long one lives following retirement. See section III for
details of costing)
.
For every year of service, one accumulates 2-^ percentage
points towards one's "multiplier" - the percentage of basic
pay received when one retires. This simple calculation is
complicated by the retired pay "inversion," the situation
arising from inflation triggering larger increases in re-




culminating in some people making more retired pay than
others (with the same grade and service) who retired later.
Before 1958. "RECOMP" tied retired pay to current active
duty pay and inversion was averted. Nevertheless, Congress
has provided two "save pay" provisions to counter the inver-
sion. The first permits the use of the basic pay scales in
effect on the day you retire or the previous year's scales
as adjusted by the CPI
.
(i.e., if the last active duty pay
raise was ^fo and retirees had just received an zfo CPI
adjustment, it would be more advantageous to use the pre-
vious year's pay scales). The second - the Tower amendment
or "look back" - provides that no member who retired since
1 January 1971 can receive less retired pay than he/she
would have received had he/she retired earlier in his/her
career (i.e.
,
one can look back to any point in one's career
when eligible to retire and calculate retirement pay as if
one had retired then)
.
Retirement pay is increased by law on 1 March and 1
September based on CPI changes from the previous June -
December and December - June periods respectively.
Unless a retiree declines coverage, a deduction for the
Survivors Benefit Plan (33P - to provide an income of up to
55% of ones retired pay for spouse and dependent children if





III. BUDGETING, ACCOUNTING A^JD COSTING FOR
MILITARY RETIREMENT
Military Retired pay is authorized annually by Congress
in the DOD Appropriations bill. For example, the 1973 ap-
propriation was $9,010,000,000 for "Retired Pay, Defense,"
under Title II of the act.
Unlike most other DOD appropriations, Retired Fay Defense
is not programmed in the Five Year Defense Plan (FYDP). Due
to retired pay's (short run) non-discretionary nature, it
would serve no purpose to structure it under a management
tool such as the FYDP. Therefore, retired pay has no pro-
gram relationship in the programming/'budgeting process.
The amount annually budgeted for retirement pay is cased
now solely on projected outlay to retirees. It is a straight-
forward calculation with numbers of rexirees as the prime
variable. The Director of Military Personnel for the Deputy
Comptroller for Programming/Budgeting in xhe Office of the
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) is responsible
for initial submission of the retired budget figures for all
services; his calculations are based simply on:
Projections of the retired roles
Past cost experience
Anticipated changes in the CPI
1
DOD has, however, proposed to change retirement oudgetmg
I
If enacted, this proposal would not alter retirement entitle-
ments. Nor does the referenced 'trust fund' have any re-






to an "accrual" system. Rather than the current pay-as-you-
go system, the plan would provide for a trust fund to elim-
inate the growing unfunded liability (given a future rate
of inflation and interest, the fund would pay future annuities)
While DOD would still maintain responsibility for administra-
tion, payment and support of retirees, the retired pay account
would be displayed under another budget function -- the
2income security function. Thus Congress would be asked to
make two annual retirement appropriations -- one to cover
retirement outlays during that year (i.e., .$10.13 in FY 1979)
and another for future retirement costs of people on active
duty (about $7.53 annually to be charged to the defense
budget). While $13B might frighten some lawmakers, others
argue that retirement costs are more accurately reflected
under the accrual concept and therefore anticipated mere
precisely.
Cost calculation for the accrual system is accomplished
by dividing the present value of active duty pay by the
present value of retirement benefits to obtain the percentage
used to calculate the liability.
While this accounting/'budgeting proposal is net actually
connected to any of the current proposals for changing the
form of military retirement, it is anticipated that it will
become entangled in the whole retirement issue and not be
acted on separately.
2Again, do not confuse this with a 1975 bill that proposed
moving the Defense Retired Pay appropriation out of the defense




Thus we see retirement budgeting as a centralized DOD
function and retirement accounting as currently failing to
recognize a significant accrued liability.
Costing
Projecting the future annual costs of military retirement
is relatively easy (or at least conceptually simple) given
force level profiles. Actuarial "rain dances" are effected
by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Military, Reserve
Affairs and Logistics) assuming the number of retirees,
when they should die, CFI changes, etc., and generally
undisputed figures are arrived at. For example, as of
December 1977 the total life time retired pay was estimated
by DOD to be
:
Amount for Pay Grade with Years Servire Retired A'
$46^,115 05 25 Summer '^^
183,900 E7 20 Summer 77
(Reference 10)
Disagreement in cost estimates arises when one attempts
to calculate the present value of future pa;^,-Tner.-:s . Selecxion
of a discount rate then becomes an issue not likely to ce
settled easily.
Further complications arise when one considers that
changing retirement policy may very likely sensitize re-
cruitment and retention success -- cornerstone objectives
of the compensation system itself and variables previously




Costing orientation would also change if the accrual
budgeting concept discussed earlier were to be adopted. For
example, according to DOD, under the current pay-as-you-go
system, major changes to the retirement system would not
show any savings for many years and would cost more initially.
RMA (see section IV) would increase retirement cost by
$50 - $150M annually for a few years before beginning to
show savings. However, the proposed (accrual) budgetary
change would result in an immediate decrease of over $500M.
(Reference 6)
.
In summary, costing military retirement can be viewed as
a relatively simple mechanical process under static conditions
or a very complex, dynamic and multivariate relationship
involving a great deal of uncertainty.
IV. CRITICS AND ALIERNATIVSS
System Criticism
Criticism of current military retirement pay comes from
s t
all levels. The 1 QRMC isee section II) made sixteen
findings concerning non-disability retirement, not the least
of which was its expensiveness and inefficiency. Most im-
portant, retired disbursments were seen increasing at a
more rapid rate than GNP. Finally, efficiency was reported
low as measured by the equation: "(system fails to meet
objective effectively) - (High Cost)"
1 Briefly, QRMC s retirem.ent objectives dealt with "management
effectivenss" and "just treatment of members."
Appendix A o^^
i
Accordingly, if an alternative system could shovm signifi-
cantly lower costs and at the same time promise more effective-
ness, it would be more efficient than the present system.
The Congressional Budget Office projects retirement costs
under the current system to be $12. 8B by I98I, a '}'}% increase
over the 1978 appropriation (reference 5) • The PCMC esti-
mates pensions will cost $30B annually within the next 20
years and terras the military retirement system "inefficient,"
"inequitable" and obviously too expensive. (Reference 12).
President Carter is concerned about rising costs and
especially dual compensation. "...i'^s too expensive...
'double dipping'. I think it ought to be eliminated."
(Reference 13)
DOD has stated the present system does not meet its needs.
"The current retirement system requires a restructuring
to correct persorjiel management, equity and cost deficiencies,"
(Reference 7) • Secretary of Defense Harold 3ro-.vn favors
ending the present 20 year system. "I think we ought to
go to a more flexible system, (rather than) a system where
you don't get anything until you've been in 20 years" (Ref-
erence 8) .
Change to the existing retirement system seems inevitable.
The unanswered questions are when and how.
Alternatives
This subsection outlines some of the retirement options




To facilitate comparison among alternatives and with the
existing system, the details of all alternatives are displayed
in Figures ^3 through ^9-
RMA was a DOD proposal submitted as legislation earlier
this decade. It has not been resubmitted as of late and is
considered "scrapped."
The Defense Manpower Commission (DMC) recommended general
concepts but no specific action or legislation.
The PCMC recommendations on retirement are the latest
"blue ribbon" input generated external to DOD, with the
"Two- tier" plan and "Early Withdrawal" alternative following in
reactionary fashion as intermediate attempts within DCD to
counter the PCMC plan. The "SECCEF" plan is the proposal
submitted by Secretary of Defense Brown to President Carter





Comparison of Alternative Retirement Flans
Notet All systems are non-contributory and provide for re-
tirement pay raises based on changes in the CPI







Vesting (way a member can
buildup a stake in his re-
tirement benefits which he
can collect on separation
with less than 20 years
service)




after 20 years service. Re-
tired pay equals S'^% of final
base pay at 20 years, this
multiplier increases by 2.S%
per year of service to maximum
of 75% for 30 years.
Snlisteds and officers leaving
voluntarily get nothing but
final paycheck if they leave
service before 20 years. In-
voluntarily separated officers
with at least 5 years service
may qualify for up to $15,000
severance pay. Officers leaving
after 20 years ge~ no severance
pay.
No vesting, however, once 20
years service attained, all
benefits to which entitled at
30 years are claimed (except
for lower amount of retired pay)
.
Social Security No offset. 'A/hen retiree reaches
the age to draw S.S. benefits,









No restriction on amount of
retired pay and civil service
benefits one can receive except
for regular officers, who must
give up some of their retired
pay (they receive $3662 of their
retired pay plus i of the re-
mainder).
Immediate eligibility to persons







Comparison of Alternative Retirement Flans











Developed by EOD in early 19'70's
submitted to 94th Congress; no
action taken, not resubmitted
since
.
Receivable after 20 years service.
Multiplier is 2.S% Per year for
20-24 years and 3^ for 25-30
years service to a maximuin of
7^fo of HIGH 1 (last cr highest
years average base pay) . Re-
tiring before 30 years service
reduces multiplier by ISfo until
one reaches time at which one
would have reached 30 years service
Involuntary separation: immedi-
ate cash payment plus an arj^.uity
at age 60 with an option of
collecting a double cash paymen*
in lieu of the deferred annuity.
Cash pa;/Tnent would be 5% of
pay times n'umber of years served.
Possible to collect more than
$15,000.
VESTING - would provide those who
left the service with between
10-19 years with an annuity at
age cO based on number of years
served.
OFFSET: at age 65, reduction
in retired pay to equal 50^ of
S.S. benefit attributable to
military service.
NA
Presumed same as current policy,
99

"Grandfathering" 20 year transition period;
- if on active duty when RMA
passed, temporary reduction
will be less than 15^ (if
you have 20 years, you
wouldn't be affected).









Comparison of Alternative Retirement Plans











The Congressicnally formed DMC
recommended general concepts
only after RMA had been sent to
Congress. Its conclusion was
basically that RMA was not the
answer to the retirement problem.
Retirement eligibility was based
on acquiring 30 points (1 pt/yr
in non-combat job; I.5 points/year
in combat job) . Retired pay based
on average yearly pay for high 3
years (HIGH 3). 30 points would
result in 30f5 cf high 3 upon re-
tirement at 30 years service.
Retirement before 30 years service
(but with 30 points) would result




after 10 years service would be
paid a lump sum readjustment pay
plus an arjiuity deferred until
age 65.
VESTING after 10 years service:
voluntary separation would yield










Comparison of Alternative Retirement Plans












(1) Give people something
when they separate early,
particularly when they
separate voluntarily.
(2) Reduce temptation to
retire after 20 years.
(3) Encourage service until




annuities at 20 years with an old age
annuity and a government paid trust ac-
count. Navy initially supports this con-
cept because it encourages people to stay
in beyond initial obligation when their











Amount of arxnuity is based c^n highest 3
years of base pay:















5-10 yrs . service: ^ of 1
pay/yr. service
IO-3O yrs. service: ? of 1
pay/yr. service
(max. in all cases is 1 yr

























ensation" trust fund set
. service. This vested
e payable at 10 or more
could be with-dra'//n in
service or let ride and
separation, could collect
or draw monthly or annual
die before collection, it
:t Fund Accumulation







OFFSET: Retirement pay reduced as a
retiree qualified for S.3. paiyments.
People working for the federal civil
service cculd not collect old age annui*:y.
Former service time counts towards civil
service retirement and vice versa. Those
qualified for military and civil service
retirement may choose most profitable
annuity.
If leave service with:
less than 15 yrs: never eligible
15-2^ yrs : eligible at 60 or c2
25 yrs. or more: eligible immediately
Any member with ^ or more years of ser-
vice when the new rules took effect would





Comparison of Alternative Retirement Plans










Similar to RMA, Army and Air Force sup-
port this alternative because they feel
20 yrs . retirement is needed to preclude
loosing too many members between 10-20
yrs. Not as flexible as Trust Funds but
more easily understood.
20 yr. retirement bu









be received at old
plier would be sam
but capped at 30 y
t payments between
Id age are smaller
2 Levels of Re-









: Full arj^.uities to
age (60). Multi-
e as "Trust Fund"
Both Two Tier and Early Withdrawal would
be generally comparable to the PCMC (Trus^
Fund) , with Two Tier tending to be higher
in value of severance pay than either
Early Withdrawal or the Trust Fund; al-
though severance is not "directly ad-
dressed" by their current alternatives.
VESTING for those who leave service be-
tween their 10-20th year in old age
annuity.
OFFSET: Same as for PCMC.
Not dealt with but assumed solved by




"Benefits" Those with 20 years service are eligible
Less than 20 years service: not eligible





Comparison of Alternative Retirement Plar.s






Compromise (between Trust Fund and Two
Tier) developed by services. Two Step
System also with members between 10-20
years service being allowed to make
early withdrawals from their first tier
annuities. An attempt to keep 20 year
annuity and still give member some vest-
ed right in that annuity before 20 years.
Same as Two Tier; however, members between
10-20 years service can make early with-
drawals from amounts credited to their
first tier annuities. (Any payments










Both Two Tier and Early Witndrawal wculd
be generally comparable to the FCMC (Trust
Fund) , with Two Tier tending to be higher
in value of severance pay that either
Early Withdrawal or the Trust Fund;
although severance is not "directly
addressed" by their current alternatives.
Same as Two Tier except rather than a
trust fund, amounts are credited to
first term annuities. Members leaving
between 10-20 yrs . will receive a portion
of their first term arjiuities {early
withdrawal) in addition to old age
vesting.
OFFSET Same as for PCMC
Not dealt with but assumed solved 'cy new
$47K ceiling on civil service pay.
Those with 20 years service are eligible.
Less than 20 years service; not eligible.




Comparison of Alternative Retirement Flans
SECDEF Plan
Features/issues Provision:
Source, Comments Secretary Brown's compromise among numer-
ous proposals developed by PCMC , the
services and the JCS
. Primary features:
(1) would give members more than they
receive now for leaving short of 20 yrs
.
(2) reduce lifetime retirement earnings
by about $50K (enlisted) and $dCK (of-
ficer) for those leaving wi-h just 20
years service and, (3) makes it more
profitable to stay for 30 years than




Also a 2 step









eligibil Lty I or
ier at age
tier annuities would range
of base pay (20 yrs.) to
Second tier pa;>Tnents
^8.5fo (20 yrs. ) to
76.2Sfo (30 yrs.). The specific multi-
plier proposed,


































2.00 ^ times YO:
: 2.25^ times YCS
: 2.75^ times YOS
age 60
Severance Pay To be paid to enlisted as well as
involuntarily separated wixh 5-19






Vesting Yes. With 10 YOS , member can withdraw
funds credited to future retirement,
while on active duty but receive less
retired pay later. Can leave service
short of 20 YOS with annuities at age
60. The specific options include:
Qualify at 10 YOS for either old-age
annuity or early-withdrawal cash.
Annuity would begin at age 60 based
on YOS under second tier formula cr :
Early withdrawal cash available after
10 YOS based on one month's basic pay
for YOS 1 to 10 and two months' basic
pay for YOS 11 to I5.
Social Security OFFSET! Annuity partially reduced when
retiree becomes eligible for Social




Presumable same as T^wc-tier.
Not addressed
Can stay with existing system or switch
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This aarvey wixi contciout-; to taesio ris-edr-hi invclv_:i^
thtS perceived ef f'^c iveness of viriJU3 Military Retirea-:it
Piano.
^hal IS EFFECT I'JEUISS'
for tue partjoses of this aarvey, "effectiveness" is
siaipiy «hit you tliin.-c is oest f:r 'Hi. 1^:1 the 3er7ice_^ As
yoa answer the questio.ts or. tie rolio«ina paj'^s, please
consider not only what woald be to y 3a r :)wn advan-.age, jit
also wnat would be best for yoir service or the J. 3.
ililitary in general.
"Effectiveness" as it relates to ^i^itary Retireaer.t can
e defined in two areas:
1 . raM§.3^^jiIll. iiiJS.h:.iy;e ness
attracting and retaining t ne xinds and nuabers
of qaaiitied aeoibers required and
a providing a socially acceptaole aethoi of
removing soae aembers who aust be separated to insure tae





a proviiing, after :nany /edcs oz fai-.hfil iservice,




first, yoa will ae asked some 51 est i or. s about yourself
so your replies can be ar.aiyzei oy category of r es por. if^n"
.
Sacoiid, we will define six general characteristics cf all
Military retirenent plans and iescriae ao'j iifferent plans
provide for these c aaract erist ics. loa will then be asked
to judge now each plan fulfills tnese defined
cna ricte ristics.
Tnird, you wixl oe as-:ed now important you t.:ink these
caaracterist ics are in relation to eacn otner and as tart of
an entire retirement plan.
iinaliy, four alternative military retirement plans wii:.
be displayed in total and you will oe asrced to ran< them oy
how you think they neet your needs and tae needs cf tae
ser V ice
.
I realize that taouthtful completion of this survey will
require a significant amount of your time. The topic or
alternative military retirement plans is soaewnit coKplei;
and unless you are familiar with tne recent proposals, it
might take soma concentration on your part to grasp tne
concepts and facts outlined in this survey. Experience with





zo coni|jic-e zhis survey. However, yotir replies will j-
carefully analyzed anl mig.it coiizriuute to i tetter
understdndin g of how Military Peoule perceive retirement
plans. If you would like a copy of tae results, please fill
out the last page of the survey, detatcn it and rDute it to
Stic I7d3 separately fr^a the guestionaire sectior. (to
preserve your anonymity).
In any event, please complete tae survey ind slot it to
SilC l7bJ.






2^ . Please circle your status:
d. Branch: LISA, Ji^, JSAF, uSMC, USC3,
Other
0. Ear. k: o 1,0 2, 3, 4, D d, 3 6, otaer
c. Sex: male, iemale
Q2. riow woald /ou categorize the effect tnat existar.ce of
a oiiiitary retxre-oent plan hal on your iecision to enlist in




d. I wouldn't have enlisted without the military 's
retirament plan
e. I was arafted and had no choice
Q3 . ihea ^ou first ioined tne service, what were your




i. Intended to 3tay in only for initial obli-ja'-ion
b . w'a3 unsure
c. Intended to stay until first eliiible for
retirement; taen get out
a. Intended to stay beyond initial retirement
eligibility
2U . *ihdt are your career intentions no'ii'? (Circle on-)
i. Get out as soon as ay current ooligation is over
0. unsure
c. otay in until I ran retire, tn en get out
i. Stay beyond first retirement eligibility
j5. How aany years of service do you nave so far? (Circle
one)
a. One to 5 years
. S ix to 10 years
c. Eleven to 15 years
d. Sixteen to 20 years




a. ^OMPrvRISON OF RETIREMENT PLANS d 'iT CD.1P0NSNT
CHARACTERISTICS
.1iiita_'y reciremer.- piins tiave s5V9ral }^±'i
£tlS:£i£t§E.i^liiS§ ^^ coracnon. Six of tnea are defined below
followed by desriptiop.3 of how diffecen*: re'ireDent plar.s
miqnr fuliili these charac terisrios. 'ion will oe asked to
juage how you feel each possible option aeasar-s ap to eioh
of the defined caaraoterist ics . ^'niie tae definitions that
foilDw ma/ not cocrespor.d exactly to yoar prior r:o*:ica of
the Meaning for these terms, please consider th'^a as
accurate for tne purpose of survey standardization. Also,
reiUeoiDer to answer based on what you tr.mx is oest for V2!i
and the service.
1 • 2§lil £:§li:E.s3iIiI:
Earlv i.et_ir_e^§en t : If a retirement plan provides
for receipt of retireinent pay (annuities) before age o 5 (tne
usual retirement age in the Q.S.) , it offers "early
retirement" to some degree. A common reference measure tor
the extent of early retirement is "tia= ilkii2iii 12 receive
retirement 211.'1- '^^- 1.12iill^ ^^ --''- anniity is not an
issue waen considering this characteristic; tne concern is
rather when the annuities begin.
For example, receiving retired pay (11 at
after 20 years service or (2) at age 52 after 30 years
service are both examples of "early retirement" situations
by our definition. However, the first case would rulri^i
this characteristic to a greater extent since retireient is




with resp-ict to tne early retirement characteristic,
let as cuiisider three options:
Plan A
Ti:ne eligible to receive retired pay:
immediately after 20 y rs . of service (YoS)
Plan B
Tiae eligible to receive retir=d pay
wich 10 to 1J foS, at agi o2
with 20 to 29 'i^S, at age 60
witn 3 or in ore YoS, it age 5 5
Plan C
Time eligible to receive retired pay:
with 10 to 10 i^S, at age oO
with 20 YoS, iranediately receive redacei annuities
until age oU, when fall aanaities oegm.
1^6. Rank: order your preference for the way these plans
provide for the early retirement cnar ac ter isti t (T:he best
being numoer 1, etc.,)




Q7. To further quantify your preference, judge now you feel




chicacteri^t ic on a zero to TOO scale (i.e. 100 wouii
represent complite fulfillment, 50 would be half
fulfillment, etc.)
Plan £y[lf iii32-}-lif iil i^ '2 ^2 l!25. i.2£ iich}_
2 . annuities
Annuities are funds paid to a retiree as a result
of his previous service. Annuities are also call=i "re-irad
pay". The degree to w nicn a retireaent plan falfills this
cnaracter istic is de-.erBined by tae amount or size of
the annuities; it is not concerned wica w^en trie retired
pay oegms.
With respect to the "Annu





Annuity formula, 2.5% of base pay fz r e a
:
I OS u:
Examples: Retirement at 20 "f o5 would yield annuities
equal -o 50% of oase pay; 30 YoS would result in the maximum





for 1 "-.o 5 YoS: 2,00% of oase pay for a^.ch YoS
for b CO 10 Yo5: 2.25% of oas-^ pay for ^ach YoS
for 11 to 35 YDS: 2.75% of base pay for ^ach YoS
Examples: When one rea::hes the tiB^.- eiigitl- to
receive retired piy, 10 fo3 wouli yi^^ld (5x2* ^ 5xz.25^)
21.25% of base pay; 23 YoS wouli return (5x2^ *- bx2.25% +
10x2. Td".) 4o.75%; 30 YoS woula result m receiving
annuities of (5:<2-'i + 5x2.25^ + 20x2.75^) 7o.25^^; 35 YoS




First step annuities, paii c r ora retirenant until
age o
for 1 to 10 YoS: 1.7 5,^ of b^se pay for each YoS
for 1 1 to 20 YoS: 2% oase pay for each YoS
for 2 1 to 30 YoS: 2.5^ oise pay for each YoS
Second step annuities, beginning at age SO
for to 5 YoS: 2% of bise pay for sicn YcS
for o to 10 YoS: 2.25b of base p^y for eacn YoS
for 11 to 30 YoS: 2.75-i of oasc pay for each
YoS
Examples: First step annuities would range from
37.5:^ of case pay with 20 YoS to o2.5^ for 30 YoS. Second
step annuities would pay 21.25^ for 10 YoS, 43.75% for 20
YoS and a aaxiaam of 76.25^ for 30 YoS.
Q8 . Rank order your preferences for the way -aese plans









Q9 . Now jud'je horf 'rfell *:hese plans Jiaat tne re qui reraen-.s o:
the annuity charicter ut ic by iraain^ it s f jxf ilLn^n t on ;
zero to lOJ scale.
Plan Eiiif iilaiailiili in ^ ^2 Hi ^21 iisiil
3 . ves t ing
Vesting proviies eligibixitj f ^r 3o:n= sort of
retirement entitleaent (eitner an iJiieiiate Ian? sua pa/n^it
before or after separation, an anniit/ r^ceivea it olu age,
or a comDination of ooth) before tae noraai retirement
£oint_^ This eligibility accrues irrespective of rfh=!":her or
not an individual reaains in tr.
retirement" .
service anti. " r.ormai
With resoect to the "vesting" caaracter ist ic , the.e






No V -33 1 1 n
-J
Example: If you voluntarily s^parat^ b-^fore tae
normal rctir-e:aent point, you receive nothin>j.
Plan 3
Members gaalif/ after 10 year-5 of service
age dnnui^y oy the following foraiuxa:
fDr 1 to 5 yoS: 2.0'j^ of oa3<= pay for
for o to 10 Yo5: 2.25^ or oase pay for





Additionally, a "deferred compensation -.rust fund"
is set up after five y 9ar5 of service. lais aaDun- would oe
payaole in total, in part, or in ^Dubma-ion after 10 YoS.
On separation, it could be coilecxed la to-ai or irawn in
mont.ily or an.iual payments. r^iis -rus" "ind rfouid
accUdiuldte by tne following formula:
lii-L Service
b to 1 1
11 to 20
2 1 to 25
25 to 30






Example : If you separa-ed at lu YoS, you wou^i
receive an old age annuity of 21.25-i of oase pay 2l2§ y^"^
would have a trust fund of about 20S of your average pay
over the last 5 yrs.
Eian C
.^leobers gualify at 10 years service for an old age
annuity. Paytaents would be by the folj.owing formula:





for G to 10 YoS: 2.25'^ of oase pay for each YoS
for 11 plu3 Yo3: 2.1Si of odse pay per YoS
Example: 10 YoS would result in an old age annuity
of 21 . 25^ of bas.9 pay .
pi^a D
Meaibers qualify at 10 years service for either:
an old age annuity by tae for .aula:
for 1 to 5 YoS: 2.00^ of Dase pay for each YoS
for 5 to 10 YoS: 2.25* of oa^e pay ror eaca YoS
for 11 plis YoS: 2.151 of oase pa/ for each Y jS
or early witadrawal casn m the aaounts:
for YoS 1 "TD 10, one ao . pay per YoS
for YoS 11 to 15, '-WO ao. pay per YoS
Example: 10 YoS would resuxt m an old a?e annuity
of 21.25% of base pay or 10 aontas pay m early witndrawal
cas h
.
Q10. tian:<. order these four options accordmj to how you
feel they provide for the vesting cnar act eristic ( with tne




Pla.i RiaiSiSikCi? can^iin^ LIL llltl kilLL
12 3 4
B 1 2 3 U
12 3 4
D 1 2 3 U
^11. :iow judge how well these options fulfill tie •/^sting
character lot ir oy graiinj B?.ch on a zero to 10J scale.
Plan FullilllSQ-Iiliil i:i 1 1:2 12'2 i2Z 2l2lll
^ • §£Z§.SJ:3.£.§. E^I
3§.verafice Pav is uoney paid ro tnose ir. vo lua tar:.!/
separated from the service before the aoraial re-ireient
point.
With respecTi to the severance pay characteristic,





OtEic3rs only wita from o zo 19 YoS receive
severance pay by c he following formula:
two months pay for each ioS, not ^-o 9xc=^9d 2 yro.
Das e pay oc J>15,0J0 (wmch ever is less)
Involuntary separation would resalt in severance oa/
for officers and enlisteds by -ne following formula :
for 5 to 10 Yo3; one guartr-r or one no. pay per
Yo3 .
for 11 wO 30 YoS; one half of one ao. p=y per Yo3.
Involuntary separarion would result in severance pay
for offic-c^rs and enlist-ds by the foraula:
5% of base pay for each toS
2^-. Rank, order these options according to how you feel they
provide ror tae severance pay charac . _ ^ - j_ ^
Plan i.i^iSi£iZ2ix ^^.n^in^ ror ei2L Li^lHL
1 2 3
1 2 3
Q13. Now judge h3 w well these options fulfill the sever




Plan Fulf iilai:2ntif ill la 12 I'lQ. il^ i^CllL
5. bsQ.Hlit3
3en?fits r=f?!: to -ligioil_ty for a°iical car^,
commssary and exjharige privileges.
Wi-h respect to the benefits characteristic, there
are cwo opLions from -nich zo choose:
£ia,n A
No eligibility for those leavmj ^itn less thar. 20
loS; ijiaeaia-e =ligioility -o per so ::s retiring with 20 or
more Yo3
.
If oae leaves *. he service witr. :
less tnan 15 Yo5 ; never eiigiole
15 to 2 '4 Yo5; eligible at age oj or 52
25 or more Yo5; eligirle laaediarely







Plm 5llliil2i:^2ii t.^il!iiili 111 212I1 IiilLL
1 2
1 2
tJ15. Now judjs how ^-11 these optiop.s falfill tna ber.efi'S
char icterist ic on a zero to 100 scale.
o
. 32ill'lt.3.2ll22illi
!£2§:iil£^lllS2itI2 -= -^- axtant -o whic.i those now
serviaq will oe abie to utilize t.ie cirrer.t retirene.it
systei: or crioos9 whether their retirenent will oe aoverr.el
by t.ie oli or new systea, if and waen a new plan is er.actei.
With respect to the gr andi at nering en araoter istic
,
there are three possiole options;
Any nenber with 4 or more YoS wnen tne new rules
Z03K effect would remain under the old retirement system.
All tnose on active duty waen the new retirement






When the new systeoi took erfert, ail those on active
da^y could stay witn the old system oc za^w coui i opt .o
switcii to the new system oy ooligating 4 iiditior.=ii Yc3.
Q16. Ranic order your preferences aiQoag these thre-^ options.




QI7. Now judge how w-ll you thip.K these optians fulfill *:.ia
grandf atherir.g char act •^rist ic , ismg a zero to lOJ scale.
Plan LiiiiiiiiSiiiiLlllii ii Q. 12 ll'l ill I^ILL
C. HSLAIIVE I^PORTaNCZ OF THE CHA.^ ACT z,R ^S I ICS "^^THIN
SSTIRE.^S.NT PLANS
Now you aave seen the definitions of the c.iar acteristi
: Make
Appendix B




oeen exposed to how different plans fulfill these
ctiaricrerut ics to vaL/inj degrees.
The followinj two -questions deal w it: h r.ow important yja
feel these chardc--er istics are withir. a wnole r-rtiretnent
plan. Again, ramember to base / d xc juigemenr oa what yDd
thin.\ is best tor you and the service.
,21b. aanic order the six characteris t icb , with 1 being tne
oest, to snow how iniportant you reei -hey are wi- .tin a
aiiitary recireaiBnt plan. Circle a na^aber after eacn
characnei is t ic to indicate it's ran.-c. Ti-iS ar- per ait *:ed
.




Benefits 1 :. 3 4 5 5
Gran arat nerin
j
12 3 4 5 5
Q19. lo further detail how important you reei eaca
characteristic is williin a whoxe retireaent plan, weia.it
each characteristic on a 100 point scale. Please fill m
the value you vouli assign to eacn of the six defined
characteristics, reaeoiber in g that eacn weigat .Tiust be




Characteristic Wei;jhi. ll-211Lil.l. iHL
Early Setirem^nt
Annuities
7 est m J
S t V e r an c 9 Pay
Bene tics
Grandfathering
J. RA.^KING TOTAL REriRE.ILNT PLANS
On -he fox lowing pages you iili fini foar co:aple^e
military retirement plans . The plans are describei in terns
of ihe six characteristics iefinei 'lease review
each plan, compare theai, and indicate your preference aaong




1 . Plan one
a. early retireient
Time eligiole to receive re-iired pay:
.mmediat ely after 20 yrs. of ^iervice (Yd3)
D. annuities
Annuity for^iaia: 2.5^ of case pay tor each YoS
up to 30 yrs
.
d. severance pay
Officers only with fron 5 ^o 19 'io5 receive
severance pay oy tne following foraula:
two months pay for each Yo5 , not to exceed 2 yrs.
oase pay or S15,uJ0 (which ever is less)
e. benefits
:io eligibility for those leaving with less than
20 YoS; imaediate eligibility to persons retiring with 20 or
more YoS
.






Time eligible to receive retired pay:
with 10 to 19 YoS, at age 62
•rfitn 20 to 2 9 Yo3, at age 6j
witn 30 or more YoS, at a^e 55
b. aanai-.ies
A Ti n u i c 7 f r 01 a 1 a :
for 1 to 5 loS: 2.0C-o or oase pay for each YoS
for D --0 10 YoJ: 2.25^^ of oase pay for each YoS
for 11 to 35 YoS: 2.75^ of oase pay for each YoS
c. vesting
Meraoers qualify after U years of service for an
ola age annuity by the following foraala:
for 1 -0 5 Y3S: 2.00"o of base pay lor each YoS
for 6 to 10 YoS: 2.25' of oase pay for each YcS
for 11 pxas YoS: 2.75^ of oase pay for each YoS
Additionally, a "deferred c ob pensa t ion trust
fund" is set up after five years of service. This amount
would oe payaole in total, in part, or in coaoination after
10 YoS, On separation, it could be collected in total or
dra^n in monthly or annual payments. Inis trust fund would




X£s^ S:|rvice % it ia§.± £iZ A,cciJia_lat =d ^^r Yo5
- o 1 1 20 ^
11 to 20 25^
21 to 25 15^
25 to 30 5fo
d. sevecmce pay
Involantary s-paration woiid resai" ir. severance
pay for oiziznzs and enlistees by zne ioilo^im foraula:
for 5 to 13 Yo3; one ^-larter of o?.e a d . pay per
YoS.
for 11 to 30 YoS; one half of one nio. ?^y per YoS.
e. benefits
If one leaves the ^ervioe wita:
less than 15 YoS; never eiijiole
15 to 24 YoS; eligible a.z age •oO or o2
2 5 or more YoS; eligible i.iiaedia telv
f. grandfathering
Any memDer with 4 or nore YoS waen the new rules






Time eligible to receive retired pay:
with 10 to 20 YoS, at i.q^ okj
wi-h 20 'ioS, la'aedia-ely receive reduced ar.r.ui*:ie5
until a^e oO, when ruli innuities oegia.
b. annul- ies
Annuit y formula :
First st-p annuities, paiu r r cm retirenent until
age oO
for 1 to 1u 'foS: 1.75,^ or jase pay for -^ach f o5
for 1 1 to 20 YoS: 2^ oase pay for each YoS
for -1 to 30 YoS: 2.5, oase pay f^r eacn Yo5
Second step annuities, bejinniri? at age 60
for to 5 YoS: 2^^ of oase pay for each YcS
for J to 10 YoS: 2.25» of case pay fcr each Yd5
for 11 to 30 YoS: 2.15:^ of oase pay for eaca
YoS
c. vesting
^lembers gualify at 10 years service for an old
age annuity. Payaents would be by tae fo:.lowing formula:
for 1 to 5 YoS: 2,00^ of base pay for each YoS
for 6 to 1u YoS: 2.25?» of oase pay for each YoS




d. sever xhce pay
lavoluntary separarion woaii result ii sev^-rance
pay for officers ind eniis'-.eds by the fjraald;
5% of case pay ror e^ch Yo3
e. benefits: not yet addressed
f. grandfathering
All those on active duty rfhen the new retirement







a. early retireaer. t
Time eligible to receive retired pay:
with 10 to 20 YoS, at age oJ
witn 20 'ioS, imaediately receive redncel annuities
until aje oO, when mil annuities o^gia.
b. annuities
Annuity fjr:nuii:
first step annuities, pa-i iroa retire.nent until
age oO
for 1 to 10 '{OS: 1 . 75 i of oase pay ror each YoS
for 11 to 23 YoS: 2 'o base pay for ea^h YcS
for 2 1 to 30 YoS: 2 . 5 t a^se pay for eacn YoS
Second step annuities, beginning at age 50
for to 5 YoS: 2% of oase pay for eich YcS
for 3 to 10 YoS: 2.25-^ of oase pay for each YoS
for 11 to 30 YoS: 2.75,^ of case tiy for eacn
YoS
c. vesring
."leabers gualify at 10 years service for e^ther^,
an old aga annuity oy the formula:
for 1 to 5 Yo5: 2.00% of base pay for each YoS
for o to 10 YoS: 2.25^ of oase pay for each YoS




or early withdrawal casQ in the amDunts:
for YoS 1 to 10, one lo . pa/ p^r YoS
for foS 11 to 15, two mo. pay per YjS
d. severance pay
Involuntary separarion would result ir. severanc;
pay for officers and enlisteds by tna forauua;
5 /& of base pay for each loS
e. benefits: not yet addressed
r. grandn athering
When the new system took effect, all those on
ac-ive duty could stay with th^ old systea or cney could opt




' Q20. Now that you ha/9 r9viewei and coapared th- four
complete retirement plans, ran:< ouiic taetn Del:)w, with * he
I
plan you judge best being nunoer 1. Ties are perm if^ei.
Also, reiLeinber to aiake your judgement Dased on whit you feel
I is best for you and the service.
i'




two 12 3 4






If you 'rfoald like a summary of tae evaluated r-sults of
this sucv-a/, please fill in your naae ctn i address below and
slot this sheet (detached from yoar sirv^y to preserve your
anonymity) to 3MC 17dJ.
NAMj;
SMC or address (if you will not oe at :i?S through June
•79)







SOURCE SUM OF SQUARES D.F. MEAN SQUARE F
Columns 2.242 5 •'+^5 106.704
Error 6.479 1542 .004
Figure 50 - ANOVA, RAW CHARACTERISTIC IMPORTANCE




ANOVA TABLE, Early Retirement Characteristic
SOURCE SUM OF SQUARES D.F. MEAN SQUARE F
Columns ^65,274.393 2 232,637.44? 444.653
Error 403,378.740 771 523-159
ANOVA TABLE, Annuities Characteristic
Columns 125,342.624 2 62,671-313 98.588
Error 490,112.659 771 635.684
ANOVA TABLE, Vesting Characteristic
Columns 352,132.674 3 117,394.225 131-145
Error 920,213.038 1028 895-149
ANOVA TABLE, Severance Pay Characteristic
Columns 16,294.226 2 3,147.113 8.785
Error 715,054.109 771 927-437
ANOVA TABLE, Benefits Characteristic
Columns 175,895-302 1 175-395-302 103.239
Error 417,448.365 25? 1,62^.315
ANOVA TABLE, Grandfathering Characteristic
Columns 11,729-562 2 5,896.231 6.694
Error 679,121.576 771 880.832





SOURCE SUM OF SQUARES D.F. MEAN SQUARE ?
Columns 75,303.690 3 25.IOI.O3O 100. 53O
Error 256,678.953 1023 2^9.633
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